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Editorial 
In this edition of Law Democracy and Development the focus is on transi-
tional justice specifically in the African context. Transitional justice is a 
key area of focus and specialisation at the Law Faculty of the University of 
the Western Cape because as the twenty-first century begins, transitions 
from repressive rule to democracy have become a worldwide phenome-
non, In many cases, the displaced regimes have been characterised by 
massive violations of human rights, Dealing with these past injustices is a 
crucial test for a new democratic order. Facing the tension between 
justice and peace, the transitional process entails tremendous challenges. 
Countries in these situations have to resolve similar problems: should or 
must they punish human rights violations committed under the old order? 
Is an amnesty permissible and necessary in the interest of peace, recon-
ciliation and unity? Does a society need an official accounting and ac-
knowledgment of the wrongs of the past? Must the public sector be 
purged of supporters of the old regime? How can the victims of human 
rights violations be assisted in some way and have their dignity restored? 
To what extent should unjustly expropriated property be restored? New 
democracies have various options in dealing with these issues. They make 
their choices according to the contexts of their transitions, taking into 
account the seriousness of the crimes committed and the amount of 
resources available to deal with these issues. 
Avril McDonald deals with the possible right of victims to truth, justice 
and remedies in situations where violations of international humanitarian 
law are so serious as to constitute crimes under international law. She 
examines international law on genOCide. crimes against humanity and the 
law on war crimes applicable in both international and internal armed 
conflicts as well as customary international law. Her paper then turns to 
examine the duty to prosecute international crimes and reviews interna-
tional practice on amnesties and truth commissions. McDonald then deals 
in some detail with the different approaches that have been adopted in 
South Africa. Rwanda and Sierra Leone. She concludes that legitimate 
concerns for the rights of perpetrators and the needs of the as a 
whole cannot be used as an excuse for ignoring the legitimate needs. 
interests and rights of victims. While recognition of the existence and 
status of victims; their involvement in a process of truth-telling and dis-
covery; acknowledgement of the wrongs done to victims; the payment of 
reparations; rehabilitation; and other modes of compensation are a][ very 
well, for many victims the need to see the worst organisers and perpetra-
tors of the most heinous crimes prosecuted and punished remains, If this 
is not accomplished. the unfulfilled need for justice and the widespread 
sense that law is worthless may remain an open wound, and reconcilia-
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Based on research with 560 victims of human rights violations in South 
Africa during the apartheid era. Gabriel O'Malley argues that the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission's work is rlawed by the lack of institu-
tional recognition for the desire of many victims for revenge. The com-
mission aimed to achieve restorative (rather than retributive) justice in 
twO ways. It demanded the "truth" about what happened from perpetra-
tors. offering in return possible immunity from criminal and civil claims 
and the granting of amnesty for certain political acts. It offered victims the 
opportunity to publicly share their stories, through written statements and 
public hearings. Perpetrators were not required to apologise or to show 
While some victims forgave perpetrators of their own accord, the 
commission's human rights values and Christian ethos required victims to 
forgive. Any expression of anger or demand for revenge was out of place. 
The author argues that retributive institutions are necessary to remove the 
psychic burden of vengeance from individuals whose vindictiveness might 
otherwise endanger them, as well as orhers. He says a programme to 
allow victims to meet the perpetrators of the human rights violation in 
question should be set up; high-ranking perpetrators should not be al-
lowed to hold public office: a reparations fund should be set up to which 
perpetrators and beneficiaries may contribute: and perpetrators who did 
not apply or qualify for amnesty should be prosecuted. 
Former Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa research 
director Charles Villa-Vicencio sees reactions to the work of the commis-
sion as falling into three categories: those who rejected the mandate of 
the commission, those who enthusiastically embraced it. and the majority 
who are ambivalent. He explores the role of the commission in creating 
an institutional memory of the past and how difficult it is for many to "get 
on with life" once the process is over. In the author'S view, it is roo soon 
to tell whether this attempt to heal the wounds of the past has been 
successful. 
Lovell Fernandez discusses the reparations policy of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. In terms of the founding Act, 
the commission merely has the power to make recommendations on 
reparations - Parliament is to decide on the maner, acting on the recom-
mendation of the President. The Reparations and Reconciliation Commit-
tee of the commission recommended the reparations take five forms: 
urgent interim reparation, individual reparation grants, symbolic repara-
tion and community rehabilitation, community rehabilitation pro-
grammes, and institutional reform. Although some urgent interim 
reparation payments have been made since 1998, many applicants are 
still waiting. While individual reparation grants are in place in theory, in 
practice no money has been earmarked for this in the Budget, and no 
government ministry has been given responSibility for implementing this 
process. The author points out that the cost to government of paying 
reparations would be a mere 0,5 per cent of the annual budget over six 
years. It is not clear why the government is failing to meet its obligations 
to pay reparations to the 22 000 victims identified by the commission. 
Jeremy Sarkin a possible model for a truth and reconciliation 
enquiry in Rwanda which was presented to that government in 1998. 











































125 000 alleged perpetrators of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda in which up 
to one million people died. he makes the case for the necessity of estab-
lishing a truth and reconciliation commission. As an interim measure. the 
author suggests that use be made of existing community-based dispute 
resolution forums known as the Gacaca for local-level enquiries into the 
genocide. The implementation of this idea would require careful planning 
and gradual expansion from a pilot programme. Traditionally made up of 
respected older men. the makeup of these structures would have to be 
carefully considered to achieve a representative body which has the 
support of the community which it serves. Communities would have to 
reach agreement beFore being able to apply to the government for such a 
structure to be established. The powers of these bodies and their relation-
ship to the formal justice system would have to be clearly defined and the 
proceedings would have to be conducted in an open manner. In conclu-
sion, Sarkin emphasises says that the Gacaca model can only be a first. 
interim step in the necessary process of national healing - a national truth 
and reconciliation commission must be established to ensure lasting 
peace in the country. 
Abdul Tejan-Cole deals with the controversial amnesty provisions of 
the Lome Peace Agreement in Sierra Leone. While the agreement calls for 
the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and recog-
nises the basic civil and political rights adopted by the United Nations and 
the Organisation of African Unity. It grants blanket amnesty to all com-
batants and collaborators against a background of appalling atrocities 
against civilians, including mass murder, rape, abduction and the brutal 
amputation of arms, legs and hands. The agreement also gives rebel 
leaders important positions in the executive. The author argues this 
amnesty removes any incentive for perpetrators to participate in the 
proposed commission's work - in fact the rebels have been rewarded for 
what they have done. The amnesty has been widely condemned. Even the 
United Nations, a guarantor of the agreement, has dissociated itself from 
the amnesty, saying it does not apply to genocide, war crimes and other 
serious violations of international humanitarian law. The author argues 
that the agreement clearly flouts international human rights and humani-
tarian law and says true and lasting peace and reconciliation cannot be 
achieved unless the rights of victims to truth, justice and reparation are 
adequately addressed. 
Jeremy Sarkin describes how Ethiopia has chosen to prosecute perpe-
trators of past human rights violations rather than to use the truth com-
mission route favoured by many other countries. However, Haile 
Mengistu Mariam and other high ranking figures in former regimes have 
fled to countries where they are immune from prosecution or extradition. 
Faced with a choice between using Ethiopian law or international custom-
ary law. the Office of the Special Prosecutor (SPO) decided to use the 
former because its definition of genOCide includes offences against politi-
cal groups. unlike the Genocide Convention. A second reason for this 
choice is that it was not clear whether it is possible to charge alleged 
perpetrators with war crimes under international customary law if the 
alleged crimes were committed in an internal conflict. (This uncertainty 
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severe delays, inexperienced and undertrained public defenders, the fact 
that habeas corpus does not apply to those accused of war crimes; and the 
fact that it may take up to 20 years ro complete the process. The author 
argues that experience shows it is very difficult to meet the hopes and 
expectations of victims during war crimes trials. Among other things, 
victims are seldom involved in such trials; they are denied the catharsis of 
a truth commission process which focuses on them as victim; a trial 
allows for only a single version of events: and a gUilty verdict is far from 
certain, given the standards of proof demanded in a criminal trial. 
Jeremy Sarkin 
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